Is Kerala on the Path of Bengal?

 

Is Kerala on the Path of Bengal?

— V. R. Ajith Kumar

As someone who has been closely following Kerala politics from Tamil Nadu for more than five years, I have received varied and often contradictory feedback. Many people argue that several achievements of the Pinarayi Vijayan government deserve appreciation: the Vizhinjam International Seaport, the rapid development of national highways, improved state highways and bridges, modern school buildings, growth in the industrial and tourism sectors, and relatively strong social welfare initiatives compared to other states. During some of my visits home, I too felt that this assessment had merit.

At the same time, many have pointed out that the Congress in Kerala remains a party riddled with factionalism, where internal power struggles and manipulation take precedence over unity and ideological clarity. Alongside this, left-leaning Hindus who adhere to a softer form of Hinduism have often reiterated that an LDF government is preferable to what they perceive as the dominance of the Muslim League during UDF regimes, and they have voted accordingly.

Another argument frequently raised is the existence of a tacit understanding between the CPM and the BJP aimed at keeping the UDF away from power. To many listeners, this argument sounds convincing. At the national level, the BJP’s principal political adversary is the Congress, and its stated goal is a Congress-free India. Kerala remains one of the few states where the BJP has not yet established deep roots. Strategically, the BJP stands to gain if one of the two dominant fronts weakens. Since dislodging the Left has historically been difficult, the calculation appears to be that repeated defeats could fracture the UDF—pushing the League towards the Left and driving a significant section of Hindus, including Congress supporters, towards the BJP.

Those who subscribe to this view argue that this is why Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan maintains a cautiously ambiguous relationship with BJP leaders, and why central agencies appear reluctant to pursue corruption and illegal wealth cases aggressively, limiting themselves instead to occasional pressure tactics against him and his family. They also acknowledge that while such arrangements may be manageable at the leadership level, it is far more difficult to convince grassroots cadres to participate in such ethically questionable strategies. Even so, they do not rule out covert political maneuvers or indirect assistance, as allegedly witnessed during the Thrissur Lok Sabha election.

However, my journalist friends who closely observe Kerala politics paint a different picture. According to them, public fatigue with the present government is growing, driven primarily by perceptions of nepotism and corruption that permeate every level of governance. They argue that Kerala’s political leadership has, within just a decade, acquired the very traits that took two to three decades to entrench themselves in West Bengal: SFI hooliganism on campuses, the arrogance of teachers’ unions in schools and colleges, the stranglehold of party organisations within the Secretariat and government offices, the overbearing attitude of party leaders even at the village level, and an increasingly ostentatious lifestyle among leaders.

They further point out that during the era when power alternated every five years, local leaders—whether in the ruling party or the opposition—remained closer to ordinary people. Today, many of them have moved into a world of wealth and privilege, accelerating the moral and organisational decline of their parties. According to this assessment, there is little chance that these leaders will voluntarily abandon such lifestyles. If forced to choose between reform and comfort, many would rather change parties than change themselves.

Serious damage has also been caused, they argue, by the CPM’s overt and covert engagement at state and local levels with extremist Islamic organisations such as Jamaat-e-Islami ,welfare party and the SDPI, its perceived protection of criminals, and its tendency to ignore the everyday sufferings of ordinary citizens. Policy paralysis and apathy—most notably the failure to implement the National Education Policy, the near-collapse of the higher education sector, and visible regression in public health—have triggered widespread dissatisfaction and protests. The absence of a clear and consistent political stance on major issues has become deeply worrying.

The Left appears to nurture the illusion that announcing a few welfare schemes close to elections will erase accumulated public anger. This belief may stem from the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 period and the two major floods, when a strong party machinery made crisis management relatively effective. But in normal times, when people are not consumed by immediate survival concerns, they reflect more seriously on governance and accountability. That phase has now arrived.

The Sabarimala gold theft controversy further exhausted a Left Front that was already weakened. With the growing perception of a CPM–BJP understanding, minority voters shifted decisively towards the UDF. Under the leadership of V. D. Satheesan and Sunny Joseph, the UDF adopted firm and consistent positions on several issues, attracting not only its traditional support base but also a significant number of neutral voters. Meanwhile, the Left steadily lost the support of soft Hindus—particularly among forward castes and sections of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes—leaving it visibly drained.

The results and trends emerging from the recent Local Self-Government elections reflect this churn beneath the surface. While they may not decisively settle the balance of power, they clearly indicate voter restlessness, erosion of unquestioned party loyalties, and a search for credible alternatives.

Perhaps the most intriguing development is within the BJP itself. State BJP president Rajeev Chandrasekhar’s recent shift in tone—from claiming that the NDA is the sole alternative to the Left, to asserting that the next Assembly election will be a contest between the UDF and the NDA—is significant. This is not mere rhetoric; it is a political signal. If left-leaning Hindus with a soft Hindutva orientation begin to believe that the BJP has emerged as a dominant force, their migration towards it cannot be ruled out.

Should that happen, Kerala may well witness a political upheaval similar to what unfolded in West Bengal and Tripura, where large sections of Marxist cadres and supporters crossed over to the BJP. If history is any guide, the question is no longer whether Kerala is changing—but how far and how fast that change will go.